The ability to correctly interpret facial expressions is key to effective social interactions. People are well rehearsed and generally very efficient at correctly categorizing expressions. However, does their ability to do so depend on how cognitively loaded they are at the time? Using repeated-measures designs, we assessed the sensitivity of facial expression categorization to cognitive resources availability by measuring people's expression categorization performance during concurrent low and high cognitive load situations. In Experiment1, participants categorized the 6 basic upright facial expressions in a 6-automated-facial-coding response paradigm while maintaining low or high loading information in working memory (N ϭ 40; 60 observations per load condition). In Experiment 2, they did so for both upright and inverted faces (N ϭ 46; 60 observations per load and inversion condition). In both experiments, expression categorization for upright faces was worse during high versus low load. Categorization rates actually improved with increased load for the inverted faces. The opposing effects of cognitive load on upright and inverted expressions are explained in terms of a cognitive load-related dispersion in the attentional window. Overall, the findings support that expression categorization is sensitive to cognitive resources availability and moreover suggest that, in this paradigm, it is the perceptual processing stage of expression categorization that is affected by cognitive load.
Facial expressions provide valuable socially relevant information. They not only offer insight into people's affective state, such as whether they are angry or happy, but also influence social judgments such as their approachability or attractiveness and one's empathetic response to them (Ickes, 1993; Willis, Palermo, & Burke, 2011) . The ability to categorize facial expressions correctly and respond appropriately to them is critical for affective social interactions. Within social psychology, expression processing has been addressed from a multitude of approaches. One perspective has been to investigate the effect of local elements such as stimuli dimensions and presentation time, which are found to affect expression categorization (for a review see Derntl, Seidel, Kainz, & Carbon, 2009) , although the sensitivity of expression categorization to more distal factors such as trait judgments of the emotion expresser (Said, Haxby, & Todorov, 2011) and individual differences in the judger's interpersonal sensitivity (Hall, Andrzejewski, & Yopchick, 2009 ) are also well documented. Thus, evidence has suggested that a combination of both local and distal factors ultimately determine expression categorization ability. Here we employ a local-level approach to investigate whether facial expression categorization occurs automatically or requires cognitive resources to make judgments. As reviewed in the next section, this is an important aspect of expression categorization that requires further clarification.
Automaticity of Affect Processing
It has long been established that regardless of race and culture, people are all remarkably adept at recognizing certain basic emotions (Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969) . Seemingly effortless, this speeded (Liu, Harris, & Kanwisher, 2002) and in certain situations unconscious (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000) and unavoidable (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001) processing of facial affect has led to the presumption that the process occurs automatically. However, more recent findings have challenged this view. For instance, the fact that perception and affective response to emotive images can be modulated by individual differences (e.g., Hall et al., 2009; Nowicki & Duke, 1994) , social relevance (e.g., Bublatzky, Gerdes, White, Riemer, & Alpers, 2014) , and cultural rearing (Biehl et al., 1997) suggests that the process is not fully automatic (for detailed reviews see OkonSinger, Lichtenstein-Vidne, & Cohen, 2013; Palermo & Rhodes, 2007) .
A key assessment of a process's automaticity is its reliance on cognitive resources (Bargh, 1994; Kahneman & Treisman, 1984; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) . Findings from clinical populations have supported that processing of facial expressions fails this test of automaticity. For example, reductions in cognitive resources due to aging (Ruffman, Henry, Livingstone, & Phillips, 2008 ) and brain injury (Yam, Babbage, Zuman, Neumann, & Waller, 2013) have been associated with reduced facial expression judgments.
The automaticity of a process in healthy populations is typically assessed by imposing concurrent cognitive load to temporarily reduce cognitive resource availability. If the process occurs equally well during no or low load conditions compared to high load conditions, it can be inferred that the process is not reliant on cognitive resources and thus occurs automatically. Such manipulations have been employed to examine the automaticity of affect processing from various avenues, and these are briefly reviewed next before highlighting the motivation to investigate the relation between facial expression categorization and cognitive load in the current studies. Erka, Kleczka, and Walter (2007) presented task-irrelevant emotional stimuli between the presentation and test phase of a short-term memory task. The neural response to the valence stimuli was reduced in difficult versus easy versions of the memory trials. In Van Dillen, Heslenfeld, and Koole's (2009; Van Dillen, Heslenfeld, & Koole, 2013) paradigm, the valent stimuli were presented first, then the cognitive task (easy or difficult arithmetic task). The neural activity in the emotion-processing region, the amygdala, was attenuated with increased load. And Roman et al. 's, (2015) study suggested that secondary-task emotional stimuli influence performance only when cognitive resources are not fully occupied by a primary task. Collectively such findings support that the response to emotional stimuli is not automatic but rather sensitive to cognitive resources availability-when people are engaged in cognitively taxing tasks, the neural response to valence information is down-regulated.
It is worth noting that the emotional information was actually task-irrelevant in the paradigms just mentioned. What affect might cognitive load have on the emotional stimuli when they are actually relevant to the task? Blair et al. (2007) presented valent stimuli in the presence or absence of a cognitively demanding numerosity task. Although behavioral responses to the valent stimuli were not recorded, the authors urged participants to attend to this information, stating that they may be questioned on it later. Kellermann et al. (2012) ensured the affective images were perceptually processed by using them as go cues during low and high cognitive load conditions. In both studies, comparable to the passive viewing studies, the brain's neuronal response to the emotional stimuli was attenuated in the presence of concurrent cognitive load. In Kron, Schul, Cohen, and Hassin's (2010) dual-load-task paradigm, participants had to actually report the feeling elicited by valent stimuli. They found the intensity of self-reported feelings were reduced while performing a concurrent cognitive load task rather than alone.
Collectively these studies support that the response evoked by valent stimuli during both passive and active viewing is reduced when cognitive resources are drained by a cognitively demanding secondary task. Although the modulation of affective response to emotional stimuli as a function of cognitive resources is informative and aids in deciphering the automaticity of emotion processing, it does not answer the arguably more ecologically pertinent question of whether conscious recognition of emotional information is impacted when cognitive resources are engaged elsewhere. Are people able to correctly categorize a person's facial expression regardless of their own personal cognitive state? Or are they more likely to make misjudgments when they interact with people in a cognitively loaded versus relaxed state? The current study aimed to investigate the dynamic between cognitive load and affect from this alternative perspective, which despite being of prime social relevance has been tackled surprisingly sparsely. A few previous studies have attempted to shed light on the relation, but as reviewed next, there is still scope to further clarify the interplay between cognitive resources and facial expression categorization. Tracy and Robins (2008) aimed to evaluate the automaticity of expression categorization by manipulating two factors: the time allowable to make a response and concurrent cognitive load. Participants were instructed to make a two-alternative forcedchoice response (yes/no) to the target emotion's appearance. Judgments were made under fast, deliberation, and concurrent cognitive load conditions (1,000 ms, 8,000 ms, and 1,500 ms to respond, respectively). The face stimuli remained on-screen until a response was made or the response window had lapsed. The accuracy rates did not differ between the fast and cognitive conditions. However, in comparison to the case in the deliberate condition, categorization accuracy was comparatively lower in the cognitive condition for fear, sadness, and surprise but not the remaining emotions (anger, contempt, disgust, happiness, and pride). This does indicate that categorization of particular emotions is impaired by cognitive limitations; however, because the response windows were unequal across conditions, interpreting the cause of the differential performance across conditions is problematic. Furthermore the 2-automated-facial-coding (AFC) paradigm is not the best representation of real-life expression judgments-people rarely question "Do these faces look surprised or not?" Rather, they judge which of several preexisting emotional categories a processed facial expression is closest to.
Phillips, Channon, Tunstall, Hedenstrom, and Lyons (2008) assessed the impact of cognitive load on this type of expression categorization ability. They asked people to categorize upright emotions with varying degrees of intensity (50%, 75%, and 100%) as one of the displayed options (2, 4, or 6 choices) under no-load and dual-load (2-back task) conditions. Emotion categorization accuracy was overall lower in the dual compared to no-load condition. The load-related accuracy deterioration was unaffected by emotion intensity, but the effect increased as a function of the number of response choices. The authors interpreted this to imply that in this scenario, perceptual processing of facial emotions is not affected but that it is the verbal naming of expressions that is sensitive to cognitive load. However, the paradigm compared no-load with dual-load task performance. Equating performance change in the dual-load task to cognitive resource reductions in such comparisons is problematic, because the effects may be due to the distraction effect of the additional secondary task rather than cognitive resources limitations per se (Kron et al., 2010) . Thus, direct tests of cognitive load's effect on expression categorization have been rare. And although previous research has suggested that expression categorization may be sensitive to cognitive load, arguably paradigm limitations restrict the conclusiveness of the effect, warranting further clarification.
Overview of the Current Research
In the current studies, we used a popular expression categorization task (Ekman et al., 1969) -participants were presented with a single facial expression and tasked to categorize it as one of the six basic facial emotions (happy, sad, anger, fear, surprise, and disgust). The expression was presented for a fixed time of 250 ms, This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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followed by the response screen, which remained until a response was made. These timings were kept consistent across all conditions, and the expression categorization always occurred in a dual-task scenario. The only variable was the degree of concurrent cognitive load. Participants were instructed to retain six sequential (low-load) or random (high-load) numbers in memory for later recall, constituting the concurrent low and high cognitive load conditions, respectively. In Experiment 1, upright images were used to first assess the effect of this cognitive load manipulation on expression categorization ability. Because previous literature has implied that expression categorization is to some degree reliant on cognitive resources (e.g., Phillips et al., 2008; Tracy & Robins, 2008) and second previous studies using comparable cognitive load manipulations have found that cognitive resources-reliant task performance is hindered in the high-versus low-load condition (e.g., Hester, Murphy, & Garavan, 2004; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004) , we predicted that expression categorization would be reduced during the high compared to the low concurrent load condition. In line with this prediction, concurrent high compared to low cognitive load did hinder expression categorizing in Experiment 1.
In Experiment 2, we attempted to further explore the cause of the deterioration. Recent studies have proposed a cognitive loadrelated dispersion in the attentional window as a mechanism for the reduced performance of cognitive resources-reliant visual tasks (e.g., Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012a , 2012b . In Experiment 2, we tested whether a similar mechanism was responsible for the altered processing of the socially pertinent visual stimuli used in the current studies that is, facial expressions.
Experiment 1

Method
Participants. Forty undergraduate students (30 female: M ϭ 19.97 years, SD ϭ 2.17; 10 male: M ϭ 20.40 years, SD ϭ 2.88) volunteered to participate in the study as part fulfillment of their course requirement.
1 Twenty-six noted their ethnicity as Caucasian, three as Asian, five as Black Afro-Caribbean, and three as mixed ethnicity; three ethnicities were undeclared.
2 All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus. The experiment was presented on an individual PC using E-Prime software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) , and responses were made using a standard keyboard. Participants were tested in individual cubicles, seated approximately 50 cm from a 21 ϫ 28 cm monitor.
Tasks. The experiment consisted of two components, a working memory (WM) task and a facial expression categorization task. First, participants were presented with a string of six digits either in ascending sequential order (low-WM load) or in random order (high-WM load) to retain in memory. The digits were presented horizontally and centrally in 32-point Arial bold font, in white, on a black background. There were four sequential six-digit low-WMload sequences and 48 random-order six-digit sequences for the high-WM load.
Participants were then presented with the face stimuli and tasked to categorize the expression as one of the six possible options. Finally, a single-digit memory probe was presented, requiring a judgment of whether it was "present" or "absent" in the initial digit sequence (see Figure 1) . The experiment had a repeated-measures design, in that each participant completed the expression categorization task under both WM-load conditions.
Materials. The face stimuli were taken from the NimStim Set of Facial Expressions images, which have high overall validity (79%) and reliability (between 79% and 100%) for the expression judgments (Tottenham et al., 2009 ). The first 10 Caucasian male and first 10 Caucasian female individuals were selected from the database, and their expressions, representing the six basic emotions (happy, sad, fear, surprise, anger, and disgust), resulted in a total of 120 images, which were included in the experiment. All images were upright, in color, and of actors between 21 and 30 years of age. The images subtended a visual angle of 16.67°h orizontally and 20.83°vertically. Procedure. Ethical approval was obtained from the institutional ethics committee prior to data collection. All participants provided informed consent prior to testing and were debriefed at the end.
The WM six-digit sequence was presented for 2000 ms, followed by a 1,500-ms blank screen, then the face stimuli for 250 ms, followed by the facial categorizing response screen displaying the six possible expression options (1 ϭ happy, 2 ϭ sad, 3 ϭ fear, 4 ϭ surprise, 5 ϭ anger, and 6 ϭ disgust). Finally, the single-digit WM probe response screen was presented, which did not have a fixed presentation interval but rather moved on following the participant's response.
On each trial, the six-digit sequences were randomly selected from the list of four or 48 sequences for the low-and high-WMload sequences, respectively. Across the experiment, the WM probe was present or absent in the original sequence equally as often, and the present WM probe was equally as likely to occur in any of the six-digit positions. Participants were instructed to press the W key if they thought the probe had been present in the original sequence and the S key if they thought it had been absent. Response mappings were counterbalanced across participants. A series of five face stimulus-response screen cycles were presented between the digit sequence and probe screens. The face stimuli were randomly selected from the possible 120 options without repetition.
WM load was manipulated between blocks, with one block of each load presented per experiment. Each WM block consisted of 12 WM and 60 face trials (i.e., 60 observations per WM-load condition). Thus, across the experiment participants responded to 120 face stimuli in total (20 of each expression type), half under each WM-load condition. WM-load block order (e.g., low-WM block first or second) was counterbalanced across participants.
1 For Experiment 1, the required sample size was estimated by using an alpha of .05 and beta of .8. The effect size used (d ϭ0.544), and prediction (one-tailed) was guided by research that used the same WM load manipulations (i.e., six digits in sequential versus random order; Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012) . These values when entered into G ‫ء‬ power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007 ) yielded a required sample size of 24.
2 Analysis of the expression categorization task data including ethnicity (Caucasian, non-Caucasian) as an additional between-subjects factor was conducted for both experiments. In both cases, the main effect ethnicity and its interactions were nonsignificant (all Fs Ͻ 1.3, all ps Ͼ .2; see the General Discussion section for further remarks on this point). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Participants completed a short practice (four WM trials and 20 face trials per WM block) before commencing the experiment. Incorrect response feedback was provided in the practice but not experimental blocks. Written and verbal instructions urged participants to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible and also explained that both components of the task were equally important.
Data analysis. The mean accuracy and response times (RTs) for correct WM trials were computed for each individual and are reported for all proceeding analysis. Because the main objective was to assess the impact that WM load has on expression categorization, for the face task accuracy analysis, we excluded incorrect memory response trials to ensure only trials in which participants were performing both tasks were analyzed, and the RT analysis was based on only correct face and WM trials for the same reasoning (see Lavie et al., 2004) . In the results presented in the next sections, p values adjusted for one-tailed comparisons are denoted by an asterisk, and post hoc t test analyses were tested against Bonferroni-corrected significance levels (p Ͻ .025).
Results
WM task. As anticipated, the accuracy level was higher in the low-WM-load (M ϭ 87.35%, SD ϭ 1.49) compared to the high-WM-load (M ϭ 81.90%, SD ϭ 1.66) trials. The result of a paired-samples t test confirmed that the difference was significant, t(39) ϭ 2.068, p ϭ .023
‫ء‬ , d ϭ .327. A similar comparison of the mean RTs on correct low-(M ϭ 1,860.09 ms, SD ϭ 410.95) and high-WM (M ϭ 1,765.76 ms, SD ϭ 411.25) trials revealed that RTs did not vary as a function of WM load (p ϭ .087, t ϭ 1.75).
Expression categorization task. Expression categorization was more accurate when concurrent WM load was low (M ϭ 80.33%, SD ϭ 7.41) compared to high (M ϭ 76.73%, SD ϭ 8.25). RTs during the two WM conditions were very similar during low-(M ϭ 1,478.78 ms, SD ϭ 361.65) and high-WM (M ϭ 1,481.86 ms, SD ϭ 323.97) loads (see Table 1 ). The results of pairedsamples t tests revealed that the effect of WM load on RTs was not significant (t ϭ Ϫ.09, p ϭ .93). However, the detrimental impact Note. RT ϭ response time. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
of increased WM load on the ability to categorize expressions correctly was significant, t(39) ϭ 2.681, p ϭ .011, d ϭ .459. Expression type analysis. Categorization accuracy levels are known to vary across the six basic facial expressions used (e.g., Ekman et al., 1969) . To assess whether there was a main effect of expression type and also whether the impact of WM load differed as a function of expression type, we conducted some additional analysis. Two 2 ϫ 6 analyses of variance (ANOVAs), with WM load (low, high) and expression type (happy, sad, anger, fear, surprise, and disgust; 10 observations per expression type cell) as within-subject factors were conducted on the RT and accuracy data.
The main effect of WM load was approaching significance, F(1, 39) ϭ 3.838 p ϭ .057, 2 ϭ .090. The accuracy ANOVA revealed a strong main effect of expression type, F(5, 195) ϭ 78.90, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .669. Happy stimuli were the easiest to categorize (96.8%), followed by anger, surprise, sad, and disgust. The accuracy of correctly categorizing fearful faces was by far the lowest, at 50.9% (see Table 2 and Figure 2 ). The interaction between WM load and expression type was not significant (F ϭ 1.47, p ϭ .2), indicating that WM load's detrimental impact on categorizing faces was indiscriminate of expression type.
The equivalent ANOVA on mean RTs on correct trials revealed a main effect of expression type, F(5, 195) ϭ 90.264, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .698. Fastest responses were to happy faces, and slowest for fearful faces. The speed of responding to the different faces closely followed the same pattern as the accuracy data, indicating an absence of speed-accuracy trade-off (see Table 2 ). The main effect of WM load and the WM Load ϫ Expression Type interaction were not significant for the RTs (F ϭ .57, p ϭ .46, and F ϭ .73, p ϭ .6, respectively).
Discussion
In Experiment 1, expression categorization performance was recorded during low and high concurrent load conditions. In line with previous findings (e.g., Ekman et al., 1969) , the ease by which each of the six expressions were categorized varied significantly. Happy stimuli were the easiest to categorize, closely followed by anger, surprise, sad, and disgust. Fearful faces were categorized the least accurately. The comparative ease of categorizing different expressions is sensitive to paradigm specifics such as stimuli dimensions, presentation time, and task instructions (for a review see Derntl et al., 2009) . The current pattern of accuracy rates paralleled those of comparable paradigms (e.g., Derntl et al., 2009; Prkachin, 2003) , thus replicating the known differential categorization accuracies for the basic expressions.
The novel objective of Experiment 1 was to assess the effect that cognitive load has on the ability to effectively categorize these facial expressions. The results demonstrated that the speed of responses was the same under the two load conditions; however, the accuracy of the judgments was significantly affected by cognitive load. Participants were worse at categorizing the expressions during high compared to low concurrent load. It is interesting that the interaction between cognitive load and expression type was not significant, indicating that the detrimental impact of cognitive load is similar for the six basic expressions tested. Possible reasons for this are addressed in the General Discussion section.
The current findings build on preceding literature that has inferred a relation between expression categorization and cognitive resources. Previous studies have compared expression categorization in no-load compared to dual-load task situations or with varying response windows, which limits inferring causality of performance changes directly to reduced cognitive resources (e.g., Phillips et al., 2008; Tracy & Robins, 2008) . Because the number of response options, presentation time, and response window were all kept consistent in the current study; expression categorization was always conducted in a dual-load task scenario; and the only variable was the level of cognitive load in the secondary WM task, the hindered expression categorization in Experiment 1 can be equated more confidently to reduced cognitive resources. More- Note. RT ϭ response time. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
over, because the reduced expression categorization in the current study occurred while number of response options was kept consistent, it implies cognitive load impacts a stage of expression processing other than response selection. Categorizing expressions is a three-stage process. First the perceptual information is processed, then this is interpreted as a particular expression, and finally a manual response mapping the interpretation to available options is made. As explained next, we suggest that the current cognitive load effects are occurring at the perceptual processing rather than response selection stage. Visual attention acts like a window or "spotlight," which can be adjusted, allowing one to focus the spotlight on relevant information and ignore that which is irrelevant (C. W. Eriksen & St. James, 1986; Jonides, 1983) . Several recent studies have suggested that increasing cognitive load causes the distribution of the attentional window to become dispersed or spread out. For example, Ahmed and de Fockert (2012b) recorded flanker task (B. A. Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) performance during concurrent low and high cognitive load. In this task, participants respond to a central target while ignoring peripheral distracting information. The pattern of interference from peripheral distractors indicated that the profile of the attentional window was more spread out (more global) when concurrent cognitive load was high compared to low. This cognitive load-related dispersion of the attentional window was further assessed utilizing the Navon paradigm (Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012a) . Navon letters are hierarchical global stimuli that are made up of smaller local-level ones (Navon, 1977) . Participants found it easier to attend to the global letter under high compared to low load and more difficult to do so when attending to the local letter-both effects additionally support a dispersion of the attentional window as a function of cognitive load. Similar effects were also reported by Marguc, Förster, and Van Kleef (2011) . The authors cognitively loaded their participants by asking them to solve demanding or easy anagrams before completing a Navon task-performance on the subsequent Navon task demonstrated that the attentional setting was more global following the demanding rather than easy situation. Finally, Van der Linden and Eling (2006)-using a different measure of cognitive depletion, mental fatigue-found a similar effect of cognitive limitations on attentional settings. Thus, substantial evidence has supported the idea that depletion in cognitive resources can cause the attentional window to become more dispersed or spread out. As explained next, we suggest that this phenomenon underlies the reduced expression categorization with increased cognitive load recorded in Experiment 1.
It is known that rather than processing individual features of faces (e.g., eye and nose) analytically, one typically processes the whole face as a gestalt (Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987) . The same applies for facial expressions; the optimal (and consequently default) setting for facial expression processing is typically holistic (e.g., Calder, Young, Keane, & Dean, 2000; Tanaka, Kaiser, Butler, & Le Grand, 2012) . A plausible explanation for the observed decline in expression categorization during high load is that the cognitive load-related dispersion in the attentional window spreads the attentional setting away from the default ideal global setting. This "overglobalization" of the attentional window is what makes it harder to correctly categorize expressions during high compared to low cognitive load. Evidence congruent with this proposal is evident in Martin, Slessor, Allen, Phillips, and Darling's (2012) study. The authors measured facial expression categorizing after the attentional setting was altered by priming. Compared to the case with local priming, the ability to correctly identify expressions in upright faces was reduced when attention was dispersed by global priming. This pattern is comparable to the reduction in expression categorization for upright faces under high WM load in the current study and supports that this effect may be due to a dispersion of the attentional setting. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
In Experiment 2 we used both upright and inverted faces to further corroborate the attentional dispersion account. Ample evidence has supported that face orientation solicits different processing styles; upright faces are processed in a task-adaptive holistic manner, whereas inversion impedes this naturalistic holistic processing of faces and promotes more local or feature-based processing, which is a less appropriate setting for expression categorization (Calder et al., 2000; Yin, 1969; Young et al., 1987) . The differential attentional settings accompanying these stimuli types provide an excellent test for the notion that cognitive load causes a dispersion in the attentional window.
In Experiment 2, for upright faces, cognitive load was anticipated to disperse attention away from the optimal global setting, and as in Experiment 1, expression categorization accuracy was predicted to be lower under high compared to low load. However, for inverted faces, high cognitive load was predicted to shift processing from the inversion solicited local setting to a more task-appropriate holistic setting, consequently improving expression categorization in inverted faces. Thus, if the decline in expression categorization were a result of cognitive load-related dispersion in the attention window, then differential effects of cognitive load would be anticipated for the upright and inverted faces.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, participants responded to upright faces under concurrent low-and high-WM load. In Experiment 2, the additional factor of orientation was included. A within-subject 2 ϫ 2 design was used to record expression categorization for the six emotions, in both upright and inverted faces, under concurrent low-and high-WM load.
Method
Participants. Forty-six undergraduate students (25 female: M ϭ 22.96 years, SD ϭ 4.93; 21 male: M ϭ 23.28 years, SD ϭ 3.35) volunteered to participate in the study in partial fulfillment of their course requirement.
3 Thirty-nine noted their ethnicity as Caucasian, three as Asian, two as Black AfroCaribbean, and two as Arabic. All had normal or corrected-tonormal vision (see footnote 2).
Materials and procedure. The upright condition was the same as in Experiment 1. The inverted condition was also the same, with the exception that the 120 images were presented following a 180°rotation. Thus, there were 60 observations per WM load and inversion condition. Condition type (e.g., upright condition first or second) was counterbalanced across participants. Participants completed the second condition 2 weeks after completing the first (see Figure 1 for a sample of upright and inverted images). Once again, a repeated-measures design was employed, in that each participant completed the expression categorization task under both WM load and inversion conditions.
Results
WM task.
A repeated-measures 2 ϫ 2 ANOVA with face orientation (upright, inverted) and WM load (low, high) was conducted to assess memory performance across conditions. The main effect of WM load was significant, F(1, 45) ϭ 21.604, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .324. As in Experiment 1, the mean accuracy rates were higher when concurrent WM load was low (M ϭ 87.39%, SD ϭ 11.36) compared to high (M ϭ 78.21%, SD ϭ 13.11). Accuracy rates were higher during upright compared to inverted trials (M ϭ 84.96%, SD ϭ 11.13, and M ϭ 80.83%, SD ϭ 12.40, respectively), F(1, 45) ϭ 6.121, p ϭ .016, 2 ϭ .121. The Orientation ϫ WM Load interaction was nonsignificant (F ϭ .527, p ϭ .47). The RTs for upright images during low and high concurrent load were M ϭ 1,865.75 ms (SD ϭ 681.50) and M ϭ 1,852.93 ms (SD ϭ 738.40), respectively, and for inverted images during low and high load were M ϭ 2,045.81 ms (SD ϭ 919.87) and M ϭ 1,919.92 ms (SD ϭ 735.12), respectively. A similar 2 ϫ 2 ANOVA for the mean RTs revealed that both main effects and the interaction were nonsignificant (all Fs Ͻ 3.49, all ps Ͼ .068).
Expression categorization task. The mean accuracy and RTs for correct face trials were computed for each individual and analyzed in two 2 ϫ 2 ANOVAs with face orientation (upright, inverted) and WM load (low, high) as within-subject factors. The RTs ANOVA revealed all main effects and the interaction were not significant (all Fs Ͻ .3, all ps Ͼ .5).
The accuracy ANOVA revealed a main effect of face orientation, F(1, 45) ϭ 32.908, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .422. Participants were less accurate when categorizing expressions in inverted (M ϭ 68.57%, SD ϭ 13.00) compared to upright (M ϭ 79.42%, SD ϭ 6.65) faces, thus replicating the face-inversion effect.
The main effect of WM load was not significant (F ϭ .151, p ϭ .70). However, relevant to the research hypothesis, the WM Load ϫ Face Orientation interaction was reliable, F(1, 45) ϭ 34.120, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .431, indicating that WM load differentially affected the ability to categorize expressions depending on the orientation of the face (see Figure 3 and Table 1 ). As in Experiment 1, when responding to upright faces, participants were more accurate when WM load was low (M ϭ 81.85%, SD ϭ 7.62) compared to high (M ϭ 77%, SD ϭ 8.57). In contrast, for the inverted faces, participants' ability to correctly categorize expressions actually improved as WM load was increased from low-(M ϭ 65.76%, SD ϭ 13.90) to high-WM (M ϭ 71.37%, SD ϭ 13.70) load.
Follow-up pairwise comparisons confirmed that the detrimental effect of load when categorizing upright faces, t(45) ϭ 3.545, p Ͻ .001
‫ء‬ , d ϭ .523, and the beneficial effect on expression categorization when faces were inverted, t(45 ϭ 4.372, p Ͻ .001, d ϭ.644, were both significant.
Expression type analysis. Similar to the case in Experiment 1, we conducted further ANOVAs incorporating expression type as an additional factor in 2 (face orientation: upright, inverted) ϫ 2 (WM load: low, high) ϫ 6 (expression type: happy, sad, anger, fear, surprise, disgust) analysis to probe whether categorization of particular expressions was affected differentially by the other factors.
3 For Experiment 2's within-subject factorial design, the sample size required for the theoretically pertinent effect (i.e., interaction) was estimated by using an alpha of .05 and beta of .8. The observed effect size for the expression categorization task in Experiment 1 (d ϭ .459) and a two-tailed prediction were used. The calculation yielded a sample size of 30. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
The main effect of expression type was significant, F(5, 225) ϭ 113.810, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .717. Overall happy stimuli were the easiest to categorize (93.1%), followed by surprise, sad, anger, and disgust (83.7, 78.6, 73.4, and 72.8, respectively) . The accuracy of correctly categorizing fearful faces was by far the lowest (43.4%; see Table 2 ).
The interaction between expression and orientation was also significant, F(5, 225) ϭ 6.256, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .122. For the upright faces, the differential face categorization accuracies mostly followed a similar pattern to that in Experiment 1 (see Figure 2) ; happy faces were categorized most accurately, followed closely by surprise, anger, sad, disgust, and finally fear. The order of accuracy levels was the same for inverted faces, the only notable difference being that angry face categorization was impacted substantially more by inversion (see Figure 2) .
The three-way Orientation ϫ WM Load ϫ Expression Type interaction was not significant (F ϭ 1.325, p ϭ .25), indicating that WM load did not differentially affect particular expressions at either orientation. The remaining effects were in line with the previously detailed 2 ϫ 2 ANOVA.
The equivalent RT ANOVA was conducted on correct trials data. For the RTs, there was a main effect of expression type, F(5, 180) ϭ 44.564, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .553, and an Expression Type ϫ Orientation interaction, F(5, 180) ϭ 3.017, p ϭ .012, 2 ϭ.077. For both of these effects, the pattern closely followed that of the accuracy data, indicating an absence of speed-accuracy trade-off (see Table 2 ). The remaining main effects and interactions were not reliable for the RTs (all Fs Ͻ 3.1, all ps Ͼ .5).
Discussion
Categorization rates for the six expressions in upright faces in Experiment 2 closely paralleled the pattern recorded in Experiment 1; happy and fear were categorized the most and least well, respectively; the remaining expressions' accuracy rates fell between these two. Categorization accuracy of the six emotions also varied for the inverted faces, and the pattern of accuracy levels was similar to that for upright faces. The only notable difference was that angry face categorization was impacted substantially more by inversion. This pronounced impact of inversion for angry faces was also detected by Prkachin (2003) . We suggest that anger is accompanied by changes in the mouth and nose region that are shared with other emotions (sadness, fear, and disgust). Scrutiny of the distinct feature-stare of the focused eyes-is required for correct categorization of anger. Inversion may make distinctions based on this isolated feature harder, which leads to the exaggerated impact of inversion for this emotion.
Orientation of the face had a substantial impact on expression categorization accuracy. Participants were less accurate when categorizing expressions in inverted compared to upright faces; thus, the face inversion effect was replicated (Calder et al., 2000; Yin, 1969) . The novel and pertinent finding was that increased cognitive load did not detrimentally impact performance in all conditions but rather that the effect depended on whether the to-beprocessed face was upright or inverted. As in Experiment 1, for upright faces, accuracy of expression type judgments was lower in high compared to low load. In contrast, the ability to correctly categorize expressions improved with cognitive load when the presented face was inverted. The differential effect of cognitive load on categorizing expressions as a function of face orientation is consistent with the cognitive load-related dispersion of attentional window explanation. According to this notion, performance for upright faces is worse during high load because the attentional setting is dispersed away from the default optimal global setting in this situation, whereas categorization of inverted faces actually improves with cognitive load because the dispersed setting shifts processing from the local to the more task-appropriate global setting in this case.
Finally, as in Experiment 1, there was an absence of an Expression Type ϫ Cognitive Load interaction, indicating that cognitive load does not differentially affect categorization of particular expressions in the current stimuli set. Reasons for this and alternative scenarios where an interaction may occur, together with the theoretical implications of the attentional window-based explanation of the load effect, are evaluated next.
General Discussion
As reviewed in the introduction, numerous studies have uncovered an interactive effect between cognitive resources and affect processing. It is known that the neural response to passively viewed (Erka et al., 2007; Van Dillen et al., 2009 ) and actively attended (Blair et al., 2007) affective stimuli and the subjective experience of feelings (Kron et al., 2010) are all reduced in the presence of concurrent cognitive load. The current findings complement this body of literature and demonstrate that the ability to categorize expressions in upright faces is similarly hampered when cognitive resources are reduced.
We then employed both upright and inverted images to assess the mechanism of cognitive load's effect on expression categorization. Whereas the efficiency of correctly categorizing expressions in upright faces was reduced with load, the performance actually improved with load for inverted faces (see Figure 3) . This differential effect of cognitive load is congruent with a cognitive This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
load-related dispersion in the attentional window (Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012b; Marguc et al., 2011) . It is known that upright and inverted faces solicit comparatively more holistic and local processing, respectively (Calder et al., 2000; Yin, 1969) . We propose that during upright face processing, the load-related dispersion in the attentional window causes an over-globalization of the attentional window, expanding the setting away from the default optimal, resulting in the decreased expression categorization. In contrast, for inverted faces, the dispersion shifts processing style from a local to a more task-relevant holistic setting, improving expression categorization in this case. Thus, the current findings not only demonstrate that expression categorization is sensitive to cognitive load but go further by elucidating the underlying attentional mechanism inflicting the effects. The current findings are compatible with the attentional explanation, but is there alternative support that facial expression processing may be affected by changes in the attentional window? As far as we are aware, cognitive load's effects on expression categorization have not been examined from this prospective previously; however, several alternative studies have found similar effects when the attentional window has been modulated by alternative means. For example, Martin et al. (2012) altered the attentional setting of participants by asking them to respond to local or global levels of Navon stimuli prior to performing an expression categorization task. Comparable to the case in the current findings, they found global priming reduced expression categorization of upright faces, whereas Weston and Perfect (2005) found that altering the attentional setting via such priming methods similarly affects face identity recognition. Furthermore, Schmid, Schmid Mast, Bombari, Mast, and Lobmaier (2011) found that the altered attentional settings associated with happy and sad moods influence expression categorization performance. Collectively such findings validate that expression categorization is impacted when the attentional window settings are altered by priming or mood. The current studies add to this by demonstrating a similar influence on expression categorization when the attentional setting is modulated by imposed cognitive load.
Next, we briefly reflect on the categorization rates of the different expressions used. Categorization accuracy levels are known to vary across the six basic facial expressions used (happy, sad, anger, fear, surprise, and disgust; e.g., Ekman et al., 1969) . In the current experiments, happy stimuli were the easiest to categorize, closely followed by anger, surprise, sad, and disgust. Fearful faces were categorized the least accurately. The expression categorization rates replicated previous patterns in comparable paradigms (e.g., Derntl et al., 2009; Prkachin, 2003) . The novel aspect was assessing the interaction between cognitive load and specific expressions. Previous literature has demonstrated that experimental factors such as inversion and presentation time (Derntl et al., 2009; Prkachin, 2003) have a differential impact on the six basic expressions; moreover, evidence for the processing preference of particular expressions also exists (e.g., Fox et al., 2000) . Thus, the possibility of a differential influence of cognitive load on the different expression types was plausible. Although there were main effects of both expression type and WM load, the WM Load ϫ Expression Type interaction was not significant, signifying that particular expressions are not differentially affected by cognitive load (see Table 2 and Figure 2 ). However, it is important to acknowledge that the absence on this effect could be due to a Type II error. Although the repeated-measures study was amply powered to detect the 2 ϫ 2 effects (see footnotes 1 and 3) and included 60 observations per condition for these comparisons, the per-condition observations were only 10 for the by-emotion-type analysis. Although previous 6-AFC expression categorization studies have based-by-emotion analysis ranging from five to 18 observations per emotion (e.g., Derntl et al., 2009; Ekman et al., 1969; Phillips et al., 2008) , recent guidelines have suggested that observations less than 20 are not adequate to capture most behavioral effects (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) . The study would thus need to be replicated with more observations at this level to claim with confidence that particular emotions are not differentially impacted by cognitive load availability.
Theoretical Implications
From a theoretical perspective, the current findings affirm the robustness and generalizability of a load-related dispersion in the attentional window. The effect has previously been recorded using letter and word stimuli (Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012a , 2012b Marguc et al., 2011) . The current findings support that the cognitive load-related shift from local to holistic settings also impacts environmentally more relevant facial expression stimuli in a similar manner. How these findings further our understating of facial expression categorization is reflected on in this section. LeDoux (1996) and Davidson and Irwin (1999) proposed that emotions are conscious experiences and thus must be represented in working memory. As such, they are reliant on cognitive resources and therefore should be sensitive to limitations in these. This general view has been refined since to account for specific empirical findings. For example, Van Dillen et al. (2009 explained cognitive load's attenuation effect on passively viewed valent stimuli in terms of a distraction effect: the distraction hypothesis, whereas Kron et al. (2010) proposed the mere resource hypothesis, which explains that both conscious feelings and cognitive tasks draw on cognitive resources and thus the experience of feelings is diminished in the presence of cognitive load. The impact of cognitive limitations on immediate categorization of facial expressions observed in the current study are in line with these general theoretical views but advance on these by proposing the attentional window-based account as a more precise explanation of cognitive load's impact in this particular scenario of affect processing.
Categorizing expressions is a three-stage process. First, the perceptual information is processed; this is then interpreted as a particular expression, and finally a manual response mapping the interpretation to available options is made. Currently there is not a consensus on which stages are affected by cognitive load. Phillips et al. (2008) found that cognitive load did not impact expression categorization as a function of intensity of expressions. The authors interpreted this to indicate that the perceptual processing of expressions is not reliant on cognitive resources. Conversely, the authors found that expression categorization ability decreases as number of response options to choose from are increased, evidencing that cognitive load affects the response-selection stage of expression categorization. However, even in the two-category choice option, the accuracy difference between no-and dual-load conditions was substantial, implying that the number of response options alone cannot wholly account for the observed cognitive load effects. Moreover, Lynn et al. (2016) used a two-label task (angry and not angry) to assess the ability of individuals naturally This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
varying in cognitive resources (high and low working memory capacity [WMC] ) to correctly categorize the expressions. The low-WMC individuals were worse at making correct categorizations, even in the two-option paradigm, compared to individuals with greater cognitive resources (i.e., high WMC), once more indicating that cognitive resources are required for a stage other than response selection. In the current experiments, load effects were found when the number of response options were kept consistent, and also opposing effects of load were found based on facial orientation; these effects are hard to consolidate with cognitive load solely affecting the labelchoice stage. Alternatively, they support that the perceptual stage of expression categorizations is sensitive to cognitive load.
But why might imposed cognitive load affect the perceptual processing stage in some scenarios (Lynn et al., 2016) but not others ? We consider that image presentation time may be an important determinant. Within the expression categorization literature, presentation time is viewed as an indicator of cognitive effort required for processing, and images have been presented using a variety of timings, ranging from 33 ms to 15 s (see Derntl et al., 2009 , for a review). Generally, accuracy rates improve as presentation times are elongated, at least prior to celling effects' taking effect. Phillips et al. (2008) displayed faces for 3 s, whereas the presentation times in the current and Lynn et al. (2016) paradigms were comparatively much shorter (250 ms and 500 ms, respectively). Thus, the sensitivity of perceptual processing to cognitive load seems to be linked to presentation time-if ample time is provided, perceptual processing is less affected by cognitive load, whereas during shorter, more cognitively effortful presentations, cognitive load has a greater influence.
Collectively these findings support that cognitive load can impact expression categorization at various stages; the current and Lynn et al. (2016) findings support an influence at the perceptual processing stage, whereas Phillip et al.'s (2008) findings establish an impact at the later response selection stage. Investigations of individual differences in the perceptual and labeling stages of expression categorizations have revealed that at best, performances on the two are only partially correlated (Croker & McDonald, 2005; Palermo, O'Connor, Davis, Irons, & McKone, 2013) , indicating that the two processes are somewhat distinct. Future studies would need to incorporate factorial designs in which presentation time and number of response options are manipulated to tease apart the comparative impact that cognitive load has on each subprocess of expression categorization. Moreover, given that everyday social encounters can require inferences of affective states during either sustained gaze or brief glances of facial expressions, further work exploring the interaction between presentation time and cognitive load is of both empirical and social importance.
Limitations and Future Directions
Although the controlled design used provided a clearer test of the effect that concurrent cognitive load has on basic expression categorization, it is important to acknowledge that there are issues inherit in such paradigms, where a forced-choice response format is used to categorize static images supposedly conveying a single emotion (see Russell, 1994, and Russell, 2013 , for detailed discussions). Although reviewing all limitations associated with this paradigm is beyond the scope for the current research, it is important to reflect on paradigm limitations that are pertinent to the current studies, that is, those that may be sensitive to cognitive load.
In the current study we used easily recognizable expression images of young Caucasian adults from the NimStim database (Tottenham et al., 2009 ). Although cognitive load did significantly reduce categorization accuracies, overall people were relatively apt at categorizing expressions, with mean accuracy rates in the high 70s for the upright images (see Table 1 ). Evidence has suggested that less recognizable and ambiguous expressions are more effortful to categorize. For example, Orgeta and Philips (2007) found that elderly, compared to young individuals, were worse at recognizing certain low-intensity emotions, which may be partially due to age-related cognitive decline. And Neta, Norris, and Whalen (2009) found ambiguous expressions took longer to respond to, denoting a potentially greater draw on cognitive resources compared to that for easily recognizable ones. Because most everyday interactions are based on subtler, low-intensity expressions (Hess, Blairy, & Kleck, 1997; Motley & Camden, 1988) , the impact of externally imposed cognitive limitations on lower intensity and more ambiguous expression processing may well be more substantial and would be an aspect worthy of future investigations.
Another factor that may interact with cognitive load's impact on expression categorization is the ethnic familiarity of the presented faces. It is well established that people do worse at processing expressions and identity of faces from an unfamiliar compared to a familiar ethnicity, the so-called ingroup advantage effect (Elfenbein, & Ambady, 2002) . This hindered performance for unfamiliar ethnicity faces implies this process is more demanding and may well be one that requires comparatively more cognitive resources. In the current experiments, all images were of Caucasian models, whereas the participant sample included both Caucasian and nonCaucasian ethnicities (South London students). The ethnicity analysis (see footnote 2) revealed that both ethnicity groups categorized expressions in the Caucasian images equally well. The absence of the ingroup advantage effect is most likely due to the high familiarity with different ethnicities in this sample (Biehl et al., 1997; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003) . The experiment would need to be replicated with participants from less ethnically diverse populations to assess potential effects between cognitive load and image ethnicity familiarity (e.g., Matsumoto, 1990 ).
Finally we would like to take a step back and consider how the current findings aid understanding of affect processing in broader terms. Here we adopted a local single-channel approach to consider how concurrent load influenced visual facial expression categorization. A cognitive-attentional account was employed to explain the observed effects. However, the utility of a single-channel approach such as this can have limitations (see Hall & Schmid Mast, 2007) . For example, information relating to a person's affective state is not extracted from a single channel, such as the visual facial expression in isolation; rather, other avenues of information, such as body language and contextual information, can influence people's judgments (e.g., Righart & de Gelder, 2008; Willis et al., 2011) .
Moreover, as reviewed in the introduction, expression categorization has been investigated from both local and distal perspectives. Distal factors such as societal influences and personality differences are also known to influence expression categorization (e.g., Hall et al., 2009; Nowicki & Duke, 1994; Said et al., 2011) .
Thus, although the current research demonstrates that expression categorization is indeed sensitive to cognitive load and provides a novel cognitive-attentional-based explanation for the impact, it is important to acknowledge that a more integrative This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
approach, taking account of both personality and cognitive factors and employing multichannel designs, are required to gain a more comprehensive understanding of how and why people respond to facial expressions the way they do.
